Analysis of Scanlon’s Moral Motivation Theory

Analysis of Scanlon’s Moral Motivation Theory

Chen Daidong＊

Any satisfactory moral theory needs to address the issue of moral motivation,“Why should a person have morality？”Breaking away from Hume’s theory of emotional motivation, Scanlon’s moral contractualism advocates a Kantian theory of rational motivation. Meanwhile, he abandons the Kantian view of formal rationality, and substitutes a substantive view of reason. On this basis, the moral reasoning of contractualism integrates the following factors, thereby offering an innovative answer to the above mentioned question: People want to get on well with others, so behaviors need to have an element of justifiability. This justifiability requirement arises from both our value systems and the requirement for reciprocal recognition. The moral justification of behavior is something we cannot reasonably reject. This kind of moral justification is of enormous importance and high priority.

Thomas Scanlon; Moral Motivation; Reciprocal Recognition; Justifiability towards Others

Moral philosophers usually think the theory of moral motivation is to answer why a person should have morality. Among the programs having appeared so far, Hume, the representative of emotionalism, answered this question through a desire-belief combination. The rationalism representative Kant, by contrast, held that human morality is rooted in the rational nature of man. Thomas Scanlon’s understanding of moral motivation underwent a transition from Hume’s emotionalmotivation theory to Kant’s rational motivation theory.①About this transition, see: Scanlon, Thomas (2003) The Difficulty of Tolerance: Essays in political philosophy, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp 124-150． Scanlon, Thomas (1998), What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, Mass．: Harvard University Press, pp147-188．Therefore, Scanlon also takes a moral rationalism position. Samuel Freeman recapitulated the basic viewpoints of moral rationalism as follows: Moral reason is a special reason, and moral motivation has its roots in practical reason. However, unlike Kant, he does not seek to derive the motivational power of morality from the categorical imperative of reason.②Freeman, Samuel (1991), “Contractualism, Moral Motivation, and Practical Reason,”in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol． 88, No． 6, p 281．He believes moral righteousness or wrongfulness in itself provides us with a reason why we should do or not do things required by morality; the moral righteousness or wrongfulness of an action is supported or opposed by the principles that people cannot reasonably refuse.

According to the reasoning model of Scanlon’s moral contractualism; people must coexist in a society and they constitute a moral community, as rational individual beings we have intrinsic value, the recognition of intrinsic value is reciprocal, and reciprocal recognition is manifested in proving to others the justification for our own actions. Morality forms the basis of public life, which is why it is extremely important. As we are moral beings, our pursuit of other values is premised upon moral justification, which thus has a high priority. The importance and priority of morality is the answer to the question of moral motivation: People should be ethical.

1. Man’s Value and Reason

Scanlon attempts to replace utilitarianism with contractualism moral theory. Its appeal lying in its interpretation of moral motivation, utilitarianism emphasizes the importance and fundamentality of an individual’s welfare. As a master value, welfare is the most important value with intrinsic absolute importance. Other values become valuable because they contain welfare or have instrumental value due to their ability to promote welfare. Thus, these kinds of values form the philosophical motive of utilitarian moral theory. To destroy the utilitarian moral model, therefore, entails the destruction of its philosophical foundation.

In Scanlon’s view, the core viewpoint of the teleology value theory is that “the inherently valuable” is to be promoted. However, he argues that values should not be understood in a purely teleological way. While seen as the goal of action, value is also perceived as the consequence of action, and consequentiality theory gives little consideration to whether an action is morally correct (moral correctness in the deontological sense) in the pursuit of maximal valuable consequence. However, one observation is that whether an action itself is appropriate has a decisive influence on the conduct of the action. In other words, we not only should be concerned with a thing’s value, but also must pay attention to the means to obtain that value. This, in effect, means that the goal does not necessarily justify the means. Another reason why Scanlon is opposed to teleology is: Values are diverse. Teleology’s understanding of value (especially utilitarianism) tends to lack diversity. Things with intrinsic value, by contrast, are diverse. In his view,“A state of consciousness, personal relationships, intellectual, artistic and moral excellence, knowledge and human life itself” all have intrinsic value.

Regarding these values, can we only promotethem through promoting consequences? The value of many valuable things and the action of pursuing that value are constitutive, and the process of pursuing value itself is also valuable. Regarding a person as a rational being, can we say that to produce the greatest possible life is the best means to promote it? Obviously not. Concerning the value of a person’life as a rational being, there should be appropriate means to respond to them, and such means also have intrinsic value. When we say something is valuable, we not only ask others to pay attention to the item or concept but also to the reasons why it is valuable. To think that something is valuable also includes responding to such value in an appropriate manner.

Starting with re-understanding the value structure, Scanlon tries to show us that human life or rational life is of great value. Associated with this is how we respond to that value. For the value of human life, Scanlon basically takes a respectful attitude. In his view, to respect for human life is undoubtedly self-evident and he is more concerned about the ways to show respect. To respect human life consists of understanding the reasons for not destroying lives, for protecting people, and for wanting them to be safe. More importantly, we must show, through our actions, respect and care for individuals. Scanlon distinguishes two views of human life, one taking life as “The person whose life it is” and the other “human life”. This distinguishing is a bit difficult to understand. In my view, the first meaning is that a rational being, in addition to having a biological life, should also lead a life corresponding to his reason which embodies his individual uniqueness and reflects on his rational nature. Put differently, he is a living man with rich life content. The second meaning is a pure animal life. For Scanlon, if a person has only that animal life, he cannot experience the life that reflects the essence of human life, and that if we allow that life to disappear it is not to disrespect his life. For the first sense of human life, we should see it from the standpoint of the one who lives, and the value of the life is equal to the reasons why one lives that life. If a person has reasons to continue to live or hope to continue to live, we have reasons to protect that life. Scanlon argues, “The value of recognizing the value of a person’s life is to respect everyone as the core of reason, or to acknowledge the convincibility of the reason why they want to live and want their lives to be better.”①Scanlon, Thomas (1998), What We Owe to Each Other, p105．Here, Scanlon relates the value of life to the understanding of reason. A person’s life in his view is a collection of reasons, the reasons for reflection, the reasons for evaluation, judgments on reason and actions according to reasons. Just as Kant sees the nature of reason as human nature, Scanlon regards reason as the basis of human value. Seen on the basis of reason, the value of human life thus asks for an appropriate response to the reasons for supporting it. How to respond? “Respecting the value of human (rational) life requires us to treat rational creatures only in such ways as those permitted by that principle—as long as we are seeking the principle of controlling each other that other rational creatures cannot reasonably reject, they cannot reasonably reject this principle.”②Scanlon, Thomas (1998), What We Owe to Each Other, p106．In other words, the way we respect the value of human life is constrained by principle, and this principle cannot be reasonably rejected by rational actors. Obviously, that the action itself has the property of being right or wrong has long been regarded as one of the core viewpoints of deontology. Then, what Scanlon wants to do here is to combine organicallythe value field and the justification field. The understanding of the value of human life (life) points directly to the core of morality. In other words, Scanlon thinks that man is a collection of reasons, which is the fundamental expression of the right of people to be treated morally. But man’s rational life or value of life does not mean that we should treat each other in the way that contractualism allows. In my view, this task is completed by the “reciprocal recognition” concept.

2. Reciprocal Recognition

Reciprocal recognition is an essential concept in Scanlon’s moral contractualism, but he neither demonstrated nor expounded on it. In What We Owe to Each Other, only one paragraph clearly expresses this idea:

Contractualism’s ideal of acting in accordance with the principle that others (with similar motives) cannot reasonably reject is an attempt to depict the relationship with others. The value and appeal of the relationship is the reason for doing what is required of our morality. Such relationships are far less personal than friendships, and may be referred to as relationships of reciprocal recognition. Being in such a relationship with others is attractive in itself we deserve to pursue it for its own sake. A moral person will avoid lying to others, avoid cheating, hurting or exploiting others, “Because these things are not justified.” However, for such a person, these demands are not mere formal commandments, but instead all aspects of the positive value of a way of living with others.①Scanlon, Thomas (1998), What We Owe to Each Other,p162．

This passage has three levels of meaning. At the first level, a person should identify the ideal of“acting in accordance with the principle that others cannot reasonably reject.” The ideal encompasses a principle of dealing with the relationship between people, and to maintain and participate in that kind of interpersonal relationship is a moral motive. Second, the kind of relationship having the property of moral motivation is “reciprocal recognition”. This in itself is seen as a purpose worth pursuing. Third, the way people behave in various moral ways is seen as a positive response to this relationship of reciprocal recognition.

At present, “recognition” is considered to occupy an important position in the multi-cultural society characterized by value pluralism. According to Charles Taylor, the requirement for recognition is premised upon recognition. Identity is the recognition of the authenticity of the other as a distinct individual. According to Herder, the socalled authenticity is: Each of us has a unique way of human existence, and each person has his or her own “scale”. The so-called identity here represents a person’s understanding of who he is and what the essential characteristics of him as a man are. That is to say, our recognition is jointly accomplished by self-understanding and recognition by others, and the latter constitutes an essential part of our identity. If we are not recognized by others, or if we are only distortedly recognized by others, our selfidentity will be significantly affected. Therefore, a person or a group will suffer real harm and distortion if the people and society around them reflect a narrow, humble and disdainful image of themselves. It means that the recognition of others or the mere distorted recognition can harm people and become a form of oppression that captures people in a false, distorted, and derogated way of being.”②Charles Taylor． The Polities of Recognition, translated by Dong Zhilin and Chen Yangu, see http://www．gongfa．com/html/gongfalunwen/20090128/242．html．From Taylor’s remarks, we can see that reciprocal recognition is a prerequisite to human-to-human, group-to-group recognition. Recognition is based on justly recognizing others as they are. Although Taylor understands recognition only from the political perspective, his political discussion is clearly morality-based. There is thus no major obstacle to the shift from political to moral discourse. For Scanlon, the reciprocal recognition between people is a natural inference of the viewpoint that man is a collection of reasons as well as respect for people. Reciprocal recognition between people is in fact the recognition of their own autonomy. And autonomy, when we have a broad understanding of it, can obviously include the persistence in the individual’s own uniqueness, as well as the development and perfection of its own nature by using different resources. On the basis of reason, the recognition of this autonomy means each one’s recognition of the unique authenticity of the other.

However, as far as social life is concerned, there is also a generalization and unification trend, which is a manifestation of the necessity of social public life. To put it another way, people’s recognizing each other’s personal authenticity cannot do without such a public communication platform. There is, therefore, no fundamental contradiction between the recognition of individual authenticity and the need for an appropriate public life. In my view, reciprocal recognition is not only based on the incommensurability of differences between people, but also takes the public life as the background. Then reciprocal recognition between people becomes a fundamental manifestation of respect for human nature.

What is the difference between respect for others and reciprocal recognition? One is the difference in subject of action. Respect for others is shown by the subject of action himself, though the subject may not obtain the other’s response. By contrast, the subject of reciprocal recognition is in effect an interactive one, and reciprocity and parity are required as far as the two parts of action are concerned. Everyone associates with each other on an equal footing. Because of the authenticity of the individual as well as the necessity of the interaction and common life among individuals, reciprocal recognition thus becomes necessary. Furthermore, we need to ask ourselves, as reciprocal recognition is not only a value, but also a way of life, then what are the specific methods that can be adopted? Such methods should be able to maintain the true nature of the subject of action on the one hand, and make it possible to live together on the other. Hence it seems that the contractual approach is about to debut. During the discussions on Scanlon’s What We Owe to Each Other at the Pacific Chapter of the American Philosophical Society, Richard Miller argued, in his paper contributed to the journal Writers and Critics, that the view to interpret Scanlon’s theory as respect for others deprives contractualism of its concern about its fundamental feature, agreement.①Watson, Gary (2002), “Contractualism and the Boundaries of Morality: Remarks on Scanlon's What We Owe to Each Other,” in Social Theory and Practice, Vol． 28, No． 2, p222．So, in my opinion, in Scanlon’s works, reciprocal recognition is not a concept that can be replaced by respect for others, but is directly related to the subsequent contractualism. This, as I understand it, is an integral part of Scanlon’s motivation of moral contractualism.

3. Justifability to Others

I classify the motivation of Scanlon’s moral contractualism into three parts. The confirmation of the value of human life or the value of rational life. The confirmation of the reciprocal recognition of human beings which is the potential basis for people’s moral action, and the direct basis being the ideal of our actions’ justifiability to others. This direct motive was mentioned many times in his 1982 dissertation Contratualism and Utilitarianism andhis 1998 treatise What We Owe to Each Other. In that article, he argued, “according to contractualism, the source of motivation that is directly triggered by the belief that an action is wrong is the desire to be able to justify one’s actions to others on grounds they could not reasonably reject. I find this an extremely plausible account of moral motivation – a better account of at least my moral experience than the natural utilitarian alternative – and it seems to me to constitute a strong point for the contractualist view.”②Scanlon, Thomas (2003), The Difficulty of Tolerance: Essays in political philosophy, p138．The remarks indicate clearly that an actor’s desire to “justify his actions to others” is the source of his contractualist motivation. In particular, Scanlon still used “desire, a word subsequently deserted by him, to express this motivation, and more importantly, to convey the motivating power of actions’ justifiability to others.” In What We Owe to Each Other, Scanlon argues that the key difference between his contractualism and other contractualist theories lies in the motivational basis of the contract. The parties whose agreement is in question are assumed not merely to be seeking some kind of advantage but also to be moved by the aim of finding principles that others, similarly motivated, could not reasonably reject.③Scanlon, Thomas (1998), What We Owe to Each Other, p5．The motive expressed here is, first of all, somewhat puzzling because the conjunction “not merely…but also” seems to suggest that Scanlon has two bases, one being advantage, the other the search for the common principle. According to the distinction made by Stephen Darwall in his Contractarianism/Contractualism, the former represents that rational individuals take morality as the constraint to the pursuit of interest, while the latter presupposes the conclusion of the principle of sharing within a specific moral context. It is impossible for these two to get mixed together. How should we understand this? In Scanlon’s view, this is one of the advantages of his contractualism: It is more inclusive than contractarianism. The rational pursuit of our interests can be reasonably proved to others; and moral necessity does not need to resort to other non-moral values for support as the necessity can inherently prove itself. Therefore, the motivation of moral action can also be reasonably justified to others. Here, the action’s “justifiable legitimacy towards others” is a formal condition. It shows what necessary conditions an action should meet to be considered permissible and morally correct. Under contractualism, a correct action must not merely prove its correctness to oneself, but also to others. Only after satisfying this symmetry can it be regarded as probably correct.

4. Moral Motivation: Substantive Reason

These three discussions on contractualist moral motivation can be summarized as viewpoints from the autonomy of the subject of action. In terms of Kant’s points of view, it is a self-disciplined moral motivation. Scanlon does not think self-discipline is the only motivation for moral action. Rather, he thinks we are forced to act morally; in other words, we are often heteronomous. This is illustrated by demonstrating the importance and necessity of morality for human life. In other words, it is supported by substantive reasons.

From the standpoint of moral reason, Scanlon argues that the issue of moral motivation can be understood in such a way: Moral grounds competewith, and then overwhelm, non-moral grounds, so the final action is naturally carried out on moral grounds. The motive is expressed thus:

How come an action that is morally wrong can provide an adequate reason why the action should be avoided? If so, what is the reason? The issues, why the correctness or wrongfulness of morality can provide the actor with the reason to take some move, is also called moral necessity.

In Scanlon’s view, the issue of moral necessity involves the importance and priority of morality. Scanlon holds that all moral theories interpret moral motives either formally or substantively. The representative formal interpretations are Kant’s categorical imperative, Habermas’s communicative rationality, and MacIntyre’s Enlightenment program.”Substantive interpretations rely on a specific reason or value, and its classical explanations are utilitarianism’s principle of “The greatest happiness for the greatest numbers” and Aristotle’s doctrine on human purpose. Substantive interpretation is better than formal interpretation, and Scanlon’s moral contractualism is a substantive way of interpretation, because the reasons used by this theory to prove the correctness or wrongfulness of moral actions are substantive reasons rather than the universal reason.

Why is morality important? In Scanlon’s view, it will be a grave mistake if a person (one who has the features normally characterizing a person, like normal intellect, emotion, will, sound body) neither sees the importance of moral reason nor is moved by moral reason to act. Moral demands, moral righteousness or wrongfulness, are determined by the grounds that others cannot reasonably reject, and these grounds form the basis of moral importance.“If one cannot see the importance of these grounds, it not only shows his attitude to other people, but also affects other people’s views regarding him; other people’s relationships with him; and even his entire life. Such is the importance of morality.”①Chen Zhen (2006), Contemporary Western Normative Ethics, Nanjing Normal University Press, p． 220．I have already mentioned that the reciprocal recognition and approval between people is essential to one’s selfunderstanding. Mill emphasizes the importance of living with our fellows, and Scanlon believes that we must live with others. In this sense, the moral reason is the embodiment of these important values. Not seeing the strength and importance of these grounds essentially compromises reciprocal recognition, and is bound to ultimately hurt the individual’s selfunderstanding. This makes it quite likely for a person to become an “exiled person” in society.

But why do ethical requirements always have priority over other requirements? In my opinion, the value of rational life, reciprocal recognition and self-understanding mentioned above have partly answered this question, because values represented by moral reason is the basic attribute of man, as well as the fundamental identity of man. We pursue all kinds of things that give us spiritual pleasure and material abundance, all of which is for this man, the foundation and highest purpose of all activities. In fact, in my opinion, morality is not against the pursuit of various interests, but the pursuit of excessive interests, which hurts the goal to be served by interest. This poses constraints to the ways that a variety of activities should be carried out. From this point of view, morality is the tool for our reciprocal protection.②Scanlon, Thomas (2003), The Difficulty of Tolerance: Essays in political philosophy, p150．However, the tool itself is irreplaceable and indispensable, with intrinsic value and even absolute value, so to speak; hence it is also the purpose.

The priority of moral reason becomes par-ticularly evident at the time of conflict with other grounds. Scanlon takes reason for example. In criticizing utilitarianism and Kantian ethics, Bernard Williams argues that the unbiased moral forms of Mill and Kant are sometimes incompatible with other forms of value (love, friendship). Scanlon puts forth two reasons to counter this accusation. First, he argues that the principle of not leaving room for friendship or other values can be reasonably rejected and therefore cannot be used as a measure for moral righteousness or wrongfulness. Second, when other values conflict with morality, if we understand this kind of value correctly, that value, in fact, does not exclude morality, but instead take morality as basis. For the first reason, for example, when my friend and another stranger are drowning and I can only save one of them. It seems that if I save my friend, Williams may say, “Obviously, the special value exceeds the moral reason.” If I save the stranger, he might say critically that morality does not leave room for a man’s special value. In my opinion, Scanlon holds a different point of view arguing in effect that the special value also contains the moral value. Suppose the above two set forth their own reasons for the opportunity to be rescued, and friend’s reasons include: First, my life is valuable (moral reason); secondly, I am his friend (special value), whereas the stranger has only one reason: My life is valuable. After the reason having the same weight is removed, the reason “that person is my friend” gets him rescued. Clearly, Scanlon does not ignore the special value. The way he defends special values is clearly different from that of Williams: Williams resorts to the special value while Scanlon turns to the lexicographical ordering of values and recourses to substantive grounds that compete with one another. Therefore, as a special value, friendship contains the recognition of the moral rights of friends as man, and, therefore, also contains the recognition of the moral rights of non-friends. When I refuse to hurt strangers to my friend’s advantage, there is no sacrifice of friendship. The priority of morality is already contained in friendship.①The reason why Scanlon tends to explain moral motivation in terms of substantive justification is that he argues only this reason can clearly illustrate the importance and priority of morality.

(English editor: Hu Jinglei)

[1] Samuel Freeman. Contractualism, Moral Motivation, and Practical Reason[J]. The Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 88, 1991.No. 6, pp. 281-303.

[2] Scanlon, Thomas. The Diffculty of Tolerance: Essays in political philosophy [M]. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

[3]Scanlon, Thomas. What We Owe to Each Other[M]. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998.

[4]Watson, Gary. “Contractualism and the Boundaries of Morality: Remarks on Scanlon's What We Owe to Each Other[J]. Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 28, 2002. No. 2

[5] Chen Zhen. Contemporary Western Normative Ethics[M]. Nanjing Normal University Press, 2006. p. 218-222.

[6]Alex Voorhoeve. Conversations on Ethics[M]. Translated by Liu Dan, Xinhua Publishing House, 2015.① Here, I draw on the explanation provided by Chen Zhen． See, Chen Zhen (2006), Contemporary Western Normative Ethics, Nanjing Normal University Press, p．218-222．

*Chen Daidong, Assistant Professor, the School of Politics and Administration, South China Normal University．

*Foundation item: Ministry of Education’s Humanities & Social Sciences Research Youth Fund Project: On“Moral Normativity”from the Perspective of“Contract Theory”(11YJC720005); Guangdong Outstanding Young Innovative Talents Training Plan Project: Possible Approaches to Constructing Morals with Contructualism: Study of Scanlon’s Ethics Thought (wym11047); National Social Sciences Fund’s West China Project: Research on the Dynamic Mechanism of Moral Practices (14ZXX019)．