US Maritime Threats to China and Thoughts on China’s Countermeasures

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In the process of defending China’s maritime rights and interests and building up its maritime power, the challenge and obstacle presented by the United State’s maritime hegemony has been ubiquitous. This needs to be properly handled if China is to protect its maritime rights and interests and build up its maritime power.

US Strategic Considerations in Encircling and Taking Measures against China

The US has adopted a “hedging” policy toward China since the end of the Cold War, taking precautionary measures against China while engaging with it. The Bush administration focused on counterterrorism and the Middle East and it did not pay much attention to China. After taking office, the Obama administration launched the strategy of “rebalancing to the Asia Pacific”,with China as its strategic “focus”. In essence, the strategy is to contain the development of China’s maritime forces for the following reasons:

The US asserts China’s military buildup will weaken the military advantages of the US in the Western Pacific.

In recent years, the combat capability of China’s naval and air forces has improved significantly. In particular, a series of “ace in the hole” weapons developed under the guidance of the concept of “asymmetric warfare” has caused the United States great concern about China’s “anti-access/area denial”(A2/AD) capabilities. In early 2009, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates wrote inForeign Affairsthat “Beijing’s investments in cyberwarfare, antisatellite warfare, antiaircraft and antiship weaponry, submarines, and ballistic missiles could threaten the United States’ primary means to project its power and help its allies in the Pacific”.1Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the pentagon for a New Age,” Foreign Affairs,January/February 2009.In the summer of that year, the Director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Andrew Krepinevich claimed that,owing to China’s A2/AD capabilities, “East Asian waters are slowly but surely becoming another potential no-go zone for US ships”.2Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., “The Pentagon’s Wasting Assets: The Eroding Foundations of American Power,” Foreign Affairs, July /August 2009, pp. 23, 33.A report to the US Congress by the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission in 2010 asserts that: “As China’s air and missile modernization efforts progress,Beijing’s ability to threaten US forward deployed forces and bases in the region is improving,” and stresses that China’s naval and air forces can attack five major air bases of the US in East Asia. In addition, the report says that China has had the capability to project military power to the first island chain and was trying to expand the capability to the second island chain. Particularly,the cruise missiles China forward deployed on air or sea platforms could hit military targets as far away as Guam. The improvement of China’s A2/AD capabilities has limited the capability of the US military to combat and operate in relevant regions. Supported by the air and missile forces, China has the capability to project strong power by sea, air and underwater, which will lead to the end of the days of the US controlling critical sea lanes. The report also says that, if the balance of power continues to tilt in favor of China to allow it to have the capability to combat beyond Taiwan, the US navy might have to withdraw to the first island chain of the Western Pacific, perhaps even farther.3US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “2010 Report to Congress of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission”, November 2010, pp. 89-91.To the US, the South China Sea is as important to China as the Greater Caribbean region in the 19th century was to the rising US. It was the control of the Greater Caribbean Sea that facilitated the US controlling the Western hemisphere at the turning point of the 20th century and having the power to influence the strategic in of the Eastern hemisphere.4Center for a New American Security, “Cooperation from Strength: the United States, China and the South China Sea,” January 2012, p14.If China becomes the leading country in the South China Sea, similar situations may occur, that is, China controlling the Western Pacific and then influencing the Western hemisphere.

The US asserts China will challenge the US-led maritime order.

US global hegemony was built on its sea-power advantage. As its core interest lies in defending its unhindered access to the sea, the US advocates absolute freedom of navigation. China pursues a strategy of offshore defense that asserts that military detection activities by foreign military ships in exclusive economic zones endanger national security and the coastal state has the right to impose restrictions on them. However, the US stresses under the pretext of the freedom of navigation that “states may not legally restrict military survey operations within their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ)”.5Bronson Percival, “The South China Sea: an American Perspective”, http://nghiencuubiendong.vn/en/conferences-and-seminars-/second-international-workshop/584-the-south-china-sea-an-americanperspective-by-bronson-percival.The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operationsjointly issued by US Navy, Marine Corps and Coastal Guard states that, “For operational purposes, international waters include all ocean areas not subject to the territorial sovereignty of any nation. All waters seaward of the territorial sea are international waters in which the high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight are preserved to the international community. International waters include contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones, and high seas.”6The US Navy, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, July 2007.The commander of US Pacific Fleet from Robert F. Willard 2007-09 pointed out that the idea of “restricted access” actively promoted by China was supported by a number of countries and was penetrating into some critical areas of the world. Once China’s view is accepted by the international community,the definition of a national EEZ in international law will be affected. EEZs account for over one-third of the total ocean area of the world and many strategic gateways and sea lanes of communication in the world are located in EEZs. Therefore, the acceptance of Chinese legal claims would fundamentally endanger the maritime rights and interests of the US. The US thinks that the Chinese interpretation of the jurisdiction over other states’ military activities in EEZs can be a component of the plan to exert exclusive control over the waters within the Nine-Dash Line, which would de facto equate to treating these areas as areas under China’s sovereignty. Walter Lohman, director of the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation, claimed that “l(fā)eft unchallenged, the Chinese claim to the South China Sea could one day leave the American Pacific Fleet asking Chinese permission to conduct routine operations. If the Chinese claims calcify at a pace similar to the development of their navy, in another 10 years, the US will have a real crisis on its hands.”7Walter Lohman, “Spratly Islands: The Challenge to US Leadership in the South China Sea,” the Heritage Foundation, February 26, 2009.

The US asserts China’s rise will threaten the security of the US’allies in the Asia-Pacific.

In recent years, the neighboring countries of China have taken advantage of the US’ “return to Asia” to consolidate and expand their illegal occupation of China’s islands and reefs, which has forced China to react. However, the US has chosen to interpret this as China asserting its strong economic and military power to achieve maritime expansion and coercion of its Asian neighbors. As the above incidents coincidentally occurred in the process of limited US retrenchment from the Middle East because of the financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis, some Asian allies of the US worried about its ability and will to fulfill its security commitments. Therefore, the US felt it was necessary to demonstrate to its allies its resolute resistance to China’s“territorial expansion” on the sea.

The US used the South China Sea disputes as the starting point for the implementation of the strategy of “rebalance to Asia”.

The South China Sea has become the focus of international public opinion, as the disputes about it are related to the national interests of many of the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and it is easy for more countries to regard the disputes as security threats as the South China Sea is an important sea lane between the Pacific and Indian Oceans.The escalation of the disputes provided an excuse for the US to return to Southeast Asia.

The US prioritizes maritime rules to regulate China’s rise.

The construction of a rules-based regional order that comports with American values and interests is a central goal of US Asia policy. Former national security advisor to the president Thomas E. Donilon said that the ultimate goal of the US’ rebalancing strategy is to ensure, by shaping behavior and game rules in the Asia Pacific Region, that “international law and norms be respected, that commerce and freedom of navigation are not impeded, that emerging powers build trust with their neighbors, and that disagreements are resolved peacefully without threats or coercion”.8Tom Donilon, “America Is Back in the Pacific and Will Uphold the Rules,” Financial Times, November 27,2011.On many occasions, US politicians have set the tone for maritime rules of behavior: ensuring freedom of navigation, unimpeded lawful commerce, respect for international laws and norms and peaceful settlement of territorial disputes.9See for example, “Remarks at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting,” Remarks by John Kerry, Sectary of State, New York City, Sept. 27,2013; “Remarks by Vice President Joe Biden on Asia-Pacific Policy,” July 19, 2013.These rules seem to be universal but are largely tailored for the US, and obviously aimed at safeguarding the US’ maritime rights.

The US Maritime Layout against China

Building naval bases and forces in the Western Pacific

In recent years, the US has increased its military presence in the Asia Pacific through a series of major adjustments. The completed adjustments include: replacing the conventionally powered aircraft carrierUSS Kitty Hawkdeployed in Japan with the nuclear powered aircraft carrierUSS George Washington; updating the destroyer squadron in Yokosuka, Japan so that the squadron has seven Aegis destroyers; deploying 24 Osprey transports in Okinawa; deploying three Los Angeles-class nuclear attack submarines in Guam; deploying three Global Hawk UAVs in Guam; increasing the number of minesweepers deployed in Sasebo from two to four; and strengthening airports, ports and other infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific region. Currently,the US military has six aircraft carriers and 31 nuclear-powered attack submarines deployed in the Asia-Pacfic. In June 2012, then-US secretary of defense Leon Panetta announced at the Shangri-la Dialogue that the US would reposture its warships from today’s roughly 50/50 percent split between the Pacific and the Atlantic to a 60/40 split between those oceans.10Remarks by US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore.With the US’ withdrawal from Afghanistan, part of US military hardware used in the Afghan battlefield will be shifted to the Asia-Pacific. This equipment includes: two Fire Scout UAVs, several electronic surveillance aircrafts, MQ-9 Reaper unmanned attack aircraft, U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, Global Hawk unmanned reconnaissance aircrafts and the Navy’s P-3s maritime patrol aircraft. The US military has also transferred EP-3 signal reconnaissance aircraft from CENTCOM to the Pacific region.

Following the acquisition of the right to use the military facilities at the Changi base of Singapore, the US announced that it would deploy four littoral combat ships in Singapore by 2016. In 2011, the US and Australia came to an agreement that allowed the US to station 2,500 marines at the base in Darwin, Australia. In 2012, the US pushed the Philippines to allow the US to enter the Subic Naval Base “semi-permanently”, while on April 28,2014, the US and the Philippines signed an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement which establishes a framework for the transit of US navy vessels and aircraft in the Philippines and strengthens the Philippines’ capabilities through participation in training and coordination. US warships have been approved for maintenance and supplies in Cam Ranh Bay. At the same time, the US has proposed to Thailand re-renting the U-tapao and Sattahip Bases, and it is considering renting on a long lease Morotai Island or Biak Island in Indonesia as a military base. It is also preparing to deploy unmanned surveillance aircrafts and unmanned attack aircraft in the Cocos Islands, Australia.

Enhancing the military capabilities and inter-operability of allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific through arms sales, military aid and joint exercises

Joint military exercises in East Asia are led by the US and supported by Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, as well as other allies, which covers almost all East Asian countries except China. These exercises in recent years have involved many participants, been conducted on a large scale, with practical and obviously purposeful training subjects. In 2011 alone, the US military and 24 Asia-Pacific countries conducted 172 exercises.11Remarks by Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter at the Woodrow Wilson Center, October 3,2012.

And in fiscal year 2012, US arms deals with Asia-Pacific economies and regions were worth $13.7 billion, an increase of 5.4 percent over the previous year.12Jim Wolf, “US arms sales to Asia set to boom on Pacific ‘Pivot’,” Reuters, January 1, 2013.In July 2012, the US and Taiwan signed a contract worth$3.8 billion, according to which the US Air Force will upgrade 145 F-16A/B fighters produced by Lockheed-Martin Corp. Meanwhile, the White House is considering selling more advanced F-16C/D fighters to Taiwan. In December of the same year, the US sold RQ-4 Global Hawk UAVs worth $1.2 billion to South Korea. The US is also selling to Japan F-35 fighters worth $5 billion and helping Japan to upgrade the Aegis ship-based missile defense systems to create a better shield against ballistic missile attacks. When then-US defense secretary Chuck Hagel visited Japan in April 2014, he said that the US would introduce to Japan two more Aegis guided-missile destroyers by 2018. The US has transferred to the Philippines two Hamilton-class patrol boats and is helping it to build a coastal monitoring center. In recent years, the US has sold to India P-8I maritime patrol aircraft, Harpoon II missiles, Hercules transport aircraft, C-17 strategic transport aircraft, Apache helicopters, among other things. In 2011 alone, the US sold arms worth $6.9 billion to India.

Putting forward the military strategy of “Air-Sea Battle”

In response to China’s “A2/AD” strategy, the US military has put forward the Air-Sea operational battle concept. This strategy relies on a highly advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) system and integrates the combat power of the naval and air forces of the US and its allies. It is aimed at weakening the effectiveness of China’s A2/AD system to regain the strategic and tactical initiatives.13US Department of Defense, Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,January 2011, p. 4.To this end, the US is actively strengthening the missile defense capabilities of its military and its allies, taking measures to better disperse critical military assets and forces (moving US forces stationed in Okinawa to the second island chain, for example), strengthening military facilities, improving remote ISR capabilities and strengthening the construction of strike platforms. Currently, the construction of a US missile defense system in Asia is well underway. In August 2012, the Chairman of the US Joint Chief of Staff Martin Dempsey said after meeting with the Chief of Staff of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces Shigeru Iwasaki that the US was planning to significantly expand its missile defense network in Asia, and it had deployed an X-band early warning radar in Tsugaru in northern Japan.In October 2012, the US-ROK security conference reached an agreement to build a kill-chain system aimed at attacking the missile launch capability of North Korea and promoting the construction of a South Korean missile defense system. In May 2014, The Wall Street Journal reported that the US was planning to deploy an advanced Terminal High Altitude Area Defense(THAAD) system in South Korea. In April 2013, the Defense Minister of Japan and the US Defense Secretary reached an agreement to deploy an X-band radar in Kyoto. After the completion of the radar base, intelligence sharing on ballistic missiles between the US and Japan can be achieved. In November 2012, the “2+2” meeting between the US and Australia allowed the US to move a C-band space surveillance radar and a space telescope to Australia to comprehensively strengthen the tracking and monitoring of missile and satellite launches by Asian countries.

Strengthening close-in surveillance on China

The US conducts hundreds of close surveillance missions each year.Entering the new century, there occurred in succession an aircraft collision over the South China Sea in 2001, the USS Impeccable incident in 2009,the Cowpens incident in 2013 and the confrontation between Chinese and US aircrafts in August 2014. These incidents were all due to the close-in surveillances of US ships and aircrafts, revealing the US’ concerns about the development of China’s military power, maritime power in particular.

Actively intervening in maritime disputes in the Asia-Pacific

After the Cold War, the US turned from being neutral on the maritime disputes in East Asia to favoring any party in the disputes except China.Entering the new century, especially recently, the US has clearly gave up its neutral position, by siding with the Philippines, Japan and other countries in their disputes in the East and South China seas. The US has encouraged and supported the Philippines, Vietnam and other claimants against China for example, by providing warships, precision-guided missiles and other weapons, and heating up US-Vietnam relations rapidly through exchanges and cooperation on military security. In July 2010 at the Foreign Ministers’Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, then-secretary of state Hilary Clinton openly that the South China Sea was related to the national interests of the US, playing up the issue of “the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea” and advocating the establishment of a multi-lateral institution for the South China Sea. Since 2014, high-level officials in US State Department and Defense Department have, on many occasions, openly accused China of“changing the status quo”, questioned the legitimacy of the Nine-Dash Line,warned China not to set up an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea, and put forward an initiative to freeze actions in the South China Sea. In the dispute between China and Japan over the Diaoyu Islands,the US Senate passed an amendment to the Defense Authorization Act on December 4, 2012, to cover Japan’s jurisdiction over the Diaoyu Islands. After China announced the establishment of the East China Sea ADIZ, the US sent B-52 bombers to the ADIZ in an openly provocative act. And when President Obama visited Japan in 2014, he openly declared that the US-Japan Security Treaty applies to the Diaoyu Islands.

Thoughts on China’s Countermeasures

The US Navy and Air Force already have a comparative advantage in the Asia-Pacific region, and the implementation of the rebalancing strategy has made that advantage more obvious, further increasing the US military pressure on China. The former US secretary of defense Leon Panetta once suggested at the Shangri-la Dialogue that the US’ deployment of the majority of its naval forces to the Asia Pacific was not aimed at containing China, but at integrating China into a framework of relationships to tackle challenges posed by such issues as humanitarian assistance, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking, piracy, trade and communication lanes. However, as one US scholar pointed out, dealing with the afore-mentioned challenges does not require more than half of the US Navy, and if China made this sort of argument to defend deploying more than half its naval forces to the Western hemisphere,American leaders would not give the argument a moment’s consideration.14Justin Logan, “China, America, and the Pivot to Asia,” Policy Analysis, No. 717, January 8, 2013.“If our primary strategic goal is some kind of deftly managed collaboration with China, we probably already have too much force in the Pacific.”15Bryan McGrath, “Estranged over A Rising China,” May 7, 2014.

The US military reposturing in the Asia Pacific focuses on strengthening the vulnerable links in its strategy of island chains, which makes China’s maritime “going out” face more potential dangers. For a long time, US military deployment in the Asia Pacific was concentrated in Northeast Asia,primarily in response to military conflicts in the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Straits. According to the new rebalancing strategy, while continuing to focus on Northeast Asia, the US is strengthening its military presence in Southeast Asia. The US military is no longer building new large permanent bases, but instead cooperating with its allies and partners in the form of rotational deployment or semi-permanent deployment. The US will ensure that its partners provide ports, airports and other facilities for its use by accepting temporary missions and participating in joint exercises, training and operations. With the US having maritime advantages, some US strategists have put forward an “offshore control” strategy against China, which plans to force China into submission by cutting off China’s sea lanes.16T.X. Hammes, “Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy,” Infinity Journal, Spring 2012.“Although American political leaders regularly deny it, the US military is working to contain China in the Asia-Pacific region. American military planners have developed a posture in Asia that is designed with the obvious purpose of putting China’s seaborne commerce at risk. ”17Justin Logan,“China, America, and the Pivot to Asia,” Policy Analysis, No.717, January 8, 2013.

Open US support of the states having island or maritime demarcation disputes with China has encouraged some of China’s neighbors to flex their muscles, arrogant with US backing, which makes it harder to solve the problem.Because the US has introduced strategic competition into the Asia-Pacific,an arms race has been provoked in Asia and the regional security situation has worsened. The US has also described China’s defense of maritime rights as “expansionism” and “endangering the freedom of navigation” to derogate China’s international image by manipulating the interpretation of rules and international public opinion. Therefore, the US has not only undermined the hard environment of China’s construction of border and coastal defense, but more importantly undermined its soft environment.

Because of the US’ intervention, the disputes over islands and maritime rights and interests between China and some neighboring countries have turned from conflicts between China and the parties concerned into those between China and the US over maritime power in the Western Pacific,regional influence and global maritime order. This kind of conflict about geostrategy, rules and orders will last throughout the process of China’s rise, and for a quite long period, the US will be strong and China will be weak, generally on the defensive. In this case, China needs to consider not only giving priority to defending its rights, but also maintaining and extending the period of strategic opportunities. Preliminary thoughts on the countermeasures are as follows:

China should step up institutional and regime building of border and coastal defenses.

In a speech at the Fifth National Conference on Border and Coastal Defense in June 2014, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China Xi Jinping underscored the need to adhere to carrying forward the spirit of reform and innovation and focus on solving the problems of institutions and regimes that constrain the practice of border and coastal defense. He said it was necessary to strengthen various aspects of border and coastal defense and to continuously enhance the ability to defend, manage and control border and coastal defense under new situations.18“Xi Jinping: Building a Bastion of Iron of Border and Coastal Defense,” Xinhua.net, June 27, 2014.Institutional building should include regime building at the top level and executive level. The top-level institutional building should focus on scientific policymaking and coordination, while institutional building at the executive level should focus on execution and cooperation, should manage the issues of division of functions and coordinate promotion to prevent relevant departments from passing the buck.

China should perfect its marine laws and regulations.

China can introduce comprehensive laws that match the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and related international laws, promptly formulate special regulations to dispose of maritime emergencies and respond to actions that violate maritime rights, providing strong legal support to defending, managing and controlling maritime rights and maritime law enforcement. Stepping up the control over disputed waters through domestic legislation would not only highlight China’s sovereign rights and jurisdiction over related areas but also have an effect on international laws and increase China’s discursive power in the international arena.

China should objectively understand the gap in strength between China and the US and avoiding confrontations.

In recent years, China’s naval and air forces have developed rapidly, but they are still lag far behind those of the US. Currently the US Navy still has absolute advantages globally and in the Western Pacific. According to data in 2010, the total tonnage of the US fleet was about 2.6 billion, more than that of the next 17 largest fleets (of which 14 are owned by the US’ allies). Besides its superiority in tonnage, the US Navy is equipped with the most advanced weapons and network-centric systems in the world. In terms of overall missile capabilities, the US Navy is stronger than the next 20 navies combined.Calculating the number of major combat ships, the US Navy is close to China and Russia combined (203 vs. 205). Calculating the tonnage, however, the total of US Navy fleet is 263 times that of China and Russia combined. US specialist Roger Cliff estimates that by 2020, the weaponry of China’s military forces will be roughly comparable to that of the US military in 2000. In the case of such a huge difference, China should avoid challenging US dominance on the sea while actively developing offshore deterrence capabilities and deterring the US from threatening China’s core interests.

China should actively participate in exchange and cooperation in regional maritime security affairs.

With expanding cooperation in maritime security being the trend of current regional security, China should adopt an open attitude toward exchanges and cooperation with other countries and actively participate in various regional maritime security dialogues and cooperation regimes. China should not refuse to participate in the activities of some organizations or regimes for political or diplomatic reasons, which will weaken its discursive power on regional maritime security affairs and further lead to its “being isolated” in fact.

China should strengthen its crisis management and control of the sea.

With the heating-up of the disputes between China and some neighboring countries over territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, the probability of incidents between naval and air forces and maritime law enforcement forces in disputed waters and airspace is increasing.To prevent crises from escalating into conflicts, even wars, China should build mechanisms for maritime crisis management and control, develop contingency plans and build systems to communicate with other countries in the event of an incident. China should focus on crisis prevention while improving its ability to manage crises.