The International Positioning of China and the Strategic Thinking of “Keeping a Low Profile but Playing a Due Role”

Wang Jisi

The International Positioning of China and the Strategic Thinking of “Keeping a Low Profile but Playing a Due Role”

Wang Jisi

How to accurately define China’s position and role in inter--national affairs and carry on and develop the strategic thinking of “keeping a low profile but playing a due role” put forward by Deng Xiaoping is a key question concerning understanding and implementing China’s current diplomatic principle.

I

How to define a country’s “international position” is not a current academic concept in the contemporary international political science or a popular issue for various countries in the world when they formulate their foreign policy. Few scholars in the world are keen on discussing the “international positioning”of their respective countries as are the Chinese scholars. The Chinese scholars are doing so because faster and more marked changes are taking place in China than in any other major countries in the world in both the overall domestic and international situations. Among all the factors that determine China’s international position, the key ones are the continuity of development as well as changes within China—but not China’s external environment.

This article shall analyze “China’s international position” in the following aspects from the sense of “actuality” but not“should be”.

First, the positioning of strength. Whether China’s GDP has overtaken that of Japan to become the first in Asia and just second to the United States in the world is a question on which different people hold different views. In my view, in comparison with Japan, not only China has bigger population, larger territory and greater economic scale, its defense capacity is also far larger than that of Japan, and it possesses nuclear weapons. It can be said that in the Asia--Pacific region, China has overtaken Japan in all aspects—political influence, geo-strategic position and geo--economic advantage. Hence, that China is the strongest power in Asia should be a widely acceptable point. What must be taken account of is that though Japan is inferior to China in terms of comprehensive “hard power”, it is a developed country allied with the United States, thereby making up for its disadvantage in geo--strategy. So far as the people’s living standard and quality as well as the national cultural, educational, and scientific and technological level are concerned, Japan is far superior to China, and the strength of its cultural soft power in Asia is no weaker than that of China’s. Similarly, what should not be neglected is that Japan’s national coherence is exceptionally strong and it has a solid political system and enjoys long--term social stability, which ensures that no political disturbance has occurred in the past years despite continued economic stagnation and recurrent government supersession. Japan’s “stability” and “quality” contrast sharply to China’s“speed” and “quantity”, and the two countries have their own strong points respectively.

Likewise, Europe should not be taken lightly. China’s economic aggregates are bigger than any single European major power, yet the economic scale of the European Union as a whole more or less equals to that of the United States. The euro is already an international currency in contention with the U.S. dollar while the Renminbi still has a long way to go to become an international currency. The gap remains big between China’s and EU’s comprehensive strength and global political influence.

Therefore, it is completely unrealistic to think that China’s real power has overtaken that of Japan and the EU to become the second strongest in the world and will equal to that of the United States in 10 to 20 years just because China’s economy in terms of GDP is already second in the world and boasts a sound growth. In particular, the growth of China’s soft power lags behind and China’s voice in the international public opinion remains weak, which is a far cry from being the “second in the world”.

It is appropriate to position China as the strongest developing power in the world.

A relatively appropriate view on the positioning of China’s strength in the world should be that China is the strongest developing power. However, emerging powers like India and Brazil as well as Russia all have their own strong points in real strength.

Second, the positioning of geo--strategy. China, which locates at the center of Asia in the sense of traditional geo--politics (i.e., the so--called Far--East excluding West Asia and Russia’s Siberia region), is an “Oriental country”. Along with the deepening of economic interdependence with the neighboring countries, China has become the economic center of the Asia--Pacific region, playing a greater leading role than the United States and Japan in the regional economic development. China has acceded to almost all regional economic organizations in East Asia and is a core member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

In geopolitics, however, it is entirely a different picture. China has not entered into political or military alliance with any of its neighboring countries but have territorial or territorial waters disputes with Japan, India, Viet Nam and other neighbors. The international security system in East Asia is centered on bilateral military ties between the United States and some East Asian countries and these military arrangements are, in some way, directed at China. This makes China unable to speak at the international political arena on some issues on behalf of the region as Germany, France or Brazil is able to do. In other words, though China enjoys geographic identity and gradually economic identity in Asia, it has difficulty to establish political identity and hence is not in a position to act as a “l(fā)eader” or“spokesman”. Moreover, while China’s interests and influence are extending to the whole globe, it is no match with the United States, the only global power, in whatever aspects.

Third, the positioning of government system. On the one hand, China, as one of the few socialist countries in the world, has unique politico--economic system, political values system and mainstream ideology. On the other, it is in the process of profound and protracted reform with a range of uncertainties on the road ahead. China remains un--unified in its territory and has outstanding social disharmony, facing deteriorating ecological environment and arduous tasks of social management. The transformation of its economic development pattern has been slow. While the state has ample financial resources and is capable to accomplish things big with concentrated efforts, the average per--capita income of the people remains low with a wide gap between the rich and the poor. China has a stable political system, but its social coherence is yet to be strengthened. While China has a distinctive mainstream ideology and a salient theme in its publicity work, the trend of thought and public opinion are daily pluralizing and the government departments are intensifying their efforts to maintain stability and guard against ideological and political infiltration by the external hostile forces. Out of various considerations both domestic and international, China takes an entirely different attitude from the Western countries toward evolvement to the multi--party system and democracy as well as division in many developing countries. The above--mentioned unique national conditions and policies show that there are still huge differences in systems and ideology between China and the developed countries and some developing nations, and such differences do not tend to mitigate. Hence, China is regarded by the Western developed countries as an “alien” in the international community.

Fourth, the positioning of international role. As a matter of fact, the so--called “international positioning” of China is by and large the positioning of China’s role, i.e., the role China plays in the international community and the responsibilities it undertakes. The positioning of role, however, is constrained by the positioning of the above--discussed three aspects. For instance, the positioning of China’s real power determines that China is not a leading force in the existing international politico--economic order. China has accepted the international rules concerning nuclear non--proliferation, fight against terror, trade and investment liberalization, protection for intellectual property rights, addressing the climate change, etc. initiated by the Western developed countries as well as the international monetary system dominated by the United States out of its own interests and following an evaluation of the balance of power between China and the West. In the meanwhile, the growing strength of China enables it to enjoy an increasingly bigger say and undertake more international responsibilities in foreign aid, peace--keeping and so on. The positioning of its geo--strategy determines that China puts far more political and economic resources and plays far greater role in its neighboring countries than in the rest of the world. The positioning of its government system determines that China is under the political pressure of the Western values system focusing on democracy and human rights and hence adheres to the principle of non--interference in the internal affairs of other countries in international relations.

The positioning of international role gives rise to another question, that is, whether China’s unique path of development could serve as a model for other countries. Despite heated discussions on the “China Model” and “Beijing Consensus”within China’s academic circles, China has no intention to propagate its development path and experience and there are no facts showing that any other country is successfully reshaping its own government system and charting its development path after the “China Model”.

Of course, the positioning of the above aspects interacts with each other and cannot be clearly separated. In brief, China’s international position can be summed up in the following points: 1, the strongest developing country with a big gap between itself and the United States, EU and Japan in the level of economic development, science and technology, education, cultural soft power, etc; 2, a major Asian power quickly extending its interests and influence to the entire globe yet unable to play a leading role in Asia; 3, a socialist power with unique political system and values system in the process of profound transformation but without complete unification of its territory and still under the threat of national separation; and 4, a beneficiary, participator and reformer of the existing international political and economic order under the constraint of the international rules dominated by the West.

II

No significant changes shall occur to the above--described“strong yet weak” “international position” of China in the foreseeable future. This determines that China has to stick to the strategic thinking of “keeping a low profile but playing a due role”.

“Strong yet weak”international position of China shall maintain in foreseeable future.

In early 1990s, the core of China’s international strategic thinking advanced by Deng Xiaoping was crystallized as“keeping a low profile but play a due role”. In 1995, during Deng Xiaoping’s lifetime, the then Foreign Minister of China Qian Qichen offered a complete and accurate exposition of the background and contents of this strategic thinking in an open speech entitled “Study Deng Xiaoping’s Diplomatic Thinking in a Profound Way and Do a Better Job in Diplomacy in the New Era”:

Around the 1990s, drastic changes took place in inter--national relations: world socialism suffered severe setback, the bipolar pattern collapsed, and various political forces divided and reorganized. The world entered a period of great transformation from the old to the new pattern and China faced with the joint pressures and threats of sanction from the Western countries. With an overall view in mind, Deng Xiaoping made a timely and incisive judgment of the drastic changes in the situation. While earnestly instructing us to be calm, calm and again calm, he raised the strategic principle of observing the situation coolly, holding our ground, acting calmly, keeping a low profile and playing a due role. He pointed out that no matter how the international situation would change, we should always steadily develop friendly relations with all countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence; maintain vigilance, fear no one and offend no one, and make friends but know what’s what; keep a low profile and not act as a banner--bearer or leader, and work hard without making over--statements or over--action; and do solid work to develop the economy without delay. He also pointed out that China is not an insignificant actor on the international stage; it could and should play its due role.

A reflection on the background shows that Deng Xiaoping had clear targets when he raised the thinking of “keeping a low profile but playing a due role”. First of all, under the adverse international situation that the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries experienced drastic changes and China suffered sanction from the West because of the political disturbances in 1989, some comrades within the Communist Party of China made an erroneous strategic judgment, fearing that the United States would shift its focus eastward to contain China with concentrated efforts. Secondly, there was pessimism in the Party, which held that the world pattern had evolved into one“dominated solely by the United States” in which China’s role became insignificant. Thirdly, some comrades became restless, requesting to take “countering peaceful evolution” as the guideline and negating the general principle of reform and opening--up in domestic work while putting up the radical proposal of confronting against the United States and the West. Fourthly, leaders of some developing countries with radical foreign policy asked China to act as the “l(fā)eader” and form a united front against the West.

Just as Deng Xiaoping put it in his talks during his southern China tour in 1992 that “China should maintain vigilance against the Right but primarily against the ‘Left’” in domestic work, the thinking of “keeping a low profile but playing a due role” was aimed at maintaining vigilance against the political schemes of the West while preventing confrontation with the latter in foreign work so as to achieve coordination and stability in both the overall domestic and external aspects. The essence of“keeping a low profile” is to be cool and prudent, work hard with devotion, concentrate efforts on our own affairs, and not to become a “l(fā)eader” in international affairs. “Playing a due role”means that that China should not unduly humble itself but should play its due role in the international arena. Some scholars argue that “playing a due role” means to be unyielding to the pressures from the West and dare to fight back, which contains some sense but is not full and complete. It is also“playing a due role” to “develop cooperation instead of confrontation” with the Western countries, accede to the World Trade Organization by surmounting all sorts of obstacles, and participate in the UN peace--keeping operations.

In the ensuing 20--odd years since the inception of this far--sighted strategic thinking of Deng Xiaoping’s, China’s comprehensive national strength has greatly expanded and its international status saliently raised while the West experienced a relative drop in its overall strength and position. Judging from this alone, we can say that there has been enormous impro--vement in China’s international environment. Thereupon, some scholars in China asserted that the idea of “keeping a low profile” is outmoded and should be replaced by a more assertive diplomatic stance of fearing no confrontation and fighting for China’s interests even if bilateral relations should break.

In view of the tendency of “rising of the emerging powers as a group and declining of the Western countries as a whole” as put by some spectators and under the circumstance of fast appro--aching of China’s economic strength to that of the developed countries in particular, saying good--bye to the period of “keeping a low profile” and opening up a new age of assertive diplomacy indeed sounds attractive to the general public and may theoretically be accepted as one of the strategic options. But there is one question deserving our pondering: why in recent years, especially in 2010, people felt that the pressure from the international environment that China faced had increased in spite of the fact that the United States and Japan were beset with difficulties both at home and abroad and the EU was depressed in both its economy and cohesion? What would be the consequences if we gave up the thinking of “keeping a low profile” now?

A clear and definite answer would emerge if we make a deeper comparison between the international pressure China faces now and the situation 20 years ago. Just as Qian Qichen pointed out at that time, “China faced with the joint pressures and threats of sanction from the Western countries”, and hence it was necessary to keep a low profile. At present, pressures from the Western countries have reduced and sanctions have been by and large removed, but the external challenges China faces are all--directional, more complicated and even more serious in some respects. The new international challenges include: in the economic field, the international financial turmoil, the economic depression of some countries and the resulting shrinking of the market, the practice of economic nationalism and trade protectionism by various countries and so on; in the field of national security, the sharpening of territorial and territorial waters disputes, threat of maritime military conflicts, nuclear arms and nuclear proliferation in the neighboring countries, international terrorism, etc; in the area of nontraditional security, the energy shortage and price--hiking of raw materials, climate change, safety of overseas nationals and enterprises, piracy, smuggling and drug--trafficking, public hygiene, food safety, and so on. In addition, the interaction between the overall domestic and international situations is far more closely linked up. The problems of the “Falungong cult” and cyber security did not exist at all 20 years ago, and the threats of “Taiwan independence”, “Tibetan independence” and “Xinjiang independence” are far more serious than before.

Besides, the Western countries, still maintaining the system of political, economic and military alliances formed during the Cold War period, command obvious superiority as a whole in the international system. The economic aggregates of trans--Atlantic union, i.e., the EU plus the United States and Canada, account for more than 50% of the world total. The figure amounts to over 60% if Japan, Australia, New Zealand and other developed economies are included. The scientific, cultural and educational level, the innovation ability and relatively stable domestic political and legal environment of the developed countries are the foundation ensuring for their international advantage for a considerably long period of time. The emerging countries with the increase of their national strength have weakened the dominant position of the West and shared some pressures on China from the West but at the same time brought some new complicated factors, both favorable and unfavorable, to the international environment of China. For instance, with the rising of the strength and position of India and Viet Nam, China’s contradiction and contention with them loom large and these countries’ relations with the United States have instead improved.

“Keep a low profile but play a due role” remains a strategic thinking of strong realistic significance.

Hence, the great change in the international pattern, including the depression of the West and rise of the emerging powers, does not naturally bring about the improvement of China’s international environment. China’s strength and position have witnessed marked enhancement compared with 20 years ago yet the international pressure it suffers does not decrease accordingly. This is what is meant by the Chinese proverb:“There are also difficulties for being big.” In the meantime, the increasingly closer interaction between the overall domestic and international situations makes the internal and external challenges interlock and interchange with each other and adds difficulty to their prevention and addressing. Moreover, it needs time for the increased national strength to translate into policy instruments to effectively safeguard the core interests of the nation.

In the event of increased but not decreased international challenges, “keeping a low profile but playing a due role”remains a strategic thinking of strong realistic significance that should be adhered to. In recent years, a kind of superficial and conceited air has occurred among some people in their exchanges with foreigners, and there is also a tendency of over--optimism on how to look at the international situation and China’s international position in some research papers and media reports. This deserves our vigilance and should be rectified. Failure to uphold the strategic thinking of “keeping a low profile” or even doing the opposite would forfeit China’s favorable development opportunity and steadily improving international image. Consequently, not only China’s relations with the United States and the West would suffer but its internal stability and development would be affected because of the difficulties in foreign relations.

III

Adherence to the strategic thinking of “keeping a low profile” does not mean to stay in a rut.

Adherence to the strategic thinking of “keeping a low profile”does not mean to stay in a rut. Without making supplements and adjustments to this thinking in accordance with the changes in the domestic and international situation in past 20--odd years, it would be difficult to carry forward the spirit of the strategy. In our external work, it is always correct to try to“play a role”; but in the absence of “keeping a low profile”, it would be like “shooting without a target”. Therefore, what needs reconsideration and reevaluation is the concept and formulation of “keeping a low profile”. The following three aspects may probably serve as the grounds and line of thinking for enhancing the idea of “keeping a low profile”in pace with the times.

First, the idea of “keeping a low profile” was directed at the United States and other Western countries at the time, and relations with the Western countries were the overwhelming priority in China’s then diplomatic work. But nowadays, China’s diplomacy has a wider vision and is much more complex, with more partners for cooperation as well as rivals in competition. The present--day international challenges come not only from the developed and developing countries as competitors but also from international organizations, some external social forces, and invisible functional problems such as shortage of natural resources and deterioration of the ecological environment. At present, “keeping a low profile” is still of great significance in handling our relations with the United States. But it would be irrelevant to apply this idea in our dealings with big countries like India or weak countries like Laos, or talking about the strategy in face of the threats of the financial turmoil or climate change.

Second, “keeping a low profile” was initially a guiding idea put forward by Deng Xiaoping for the sake of unifying the understanding of the Party leadership known by only few people in the decision--making and research departments. But around 1996, this expression began to appear in newspapers and periodicals in China, gradually becoming an open idea known to all. Especially in recent years, foreign think--tanks and scholars are most concerned about China’s adjustment on its strategic thinking on diplomacy and hence whether China would adhere to “keeping a low profile” has become an important topic for study. Chinese scholars have also published lots of expositions to expound this concept.

The original connotation of the Chinese proverb of “keeping a low profile” is concealing one’s ability and its denotation is to make a plan at a time when one’s ability grows to certain extent. Though it is improper to say that this expression inevitably contains negative meaning, it cannot be denied that no matter what new explanations and interpretations are given to it, its extended meaning cannot be covered, that is, it is a way of conduct that one adopts in a given period of time in order to achieve his long--term objective. In the daily life of the Chinese, those knowing to keep a low profile are people with ambition, perseverance and calculation. It is considered to be well-- intended if you advise yourself or your kith and kin to “keep a low profile”, but if you tell others that you are “keeping a low profile” or say that “someone is keeping a low profile”, you are likely to be misunderstood or loathed. This is why Deng Xiaoping only raised this idea in closed--door speeches and did not make it a principle to be widely publicized. To us Chinese, we have to make a distinction between what is for internal information and what is for external publicity, whether it is family affairs, public affairs or state affairs.

Therefore, negative effect might occur both internally or externally when this idea was made public and was publicized according to its literal meaning. Internally, there is a common question: how long should be stick to “keeping a low profile” since China is already strong, as if it is only a way of thinking in a given period of time. Externally, it would arouse people’s association of the rise of a major power, that is, China might endure hardships and show great fortitude in a given period but would discard the thinking of “keeping a low profile” to adopt instead an aggressive stance and policy to avenge for the century--old humiliation once it grows strong in confidence and strength. We should not stubbornly blame domestic and foreign opinions for distorting this concept or make excess associations, for the formulation of an internal idea might change when it is set for external publicity.

Third, when the doubt “what kind of country China would become when it grows strong” looms larger in the international community, it would be more difficult to explain “keeping a low profile” and convince others. “Keeping a low profile” is usually an attitude showing calmness, confidence and resolution when one is relatively weak in strength and low in position and a philosophy of life aiming at long--term objectives. However, except self--cultivation and improvement, no one can see clearly the values orientation, strategic objectives and means to achieve them from “keeping a low profile”. Questions such as what China wants or does not want in the world today, how should it coexist with other relatively weak and small countries, how should it take counter--measures against oppressions from strong powers and how should it respond to major crises are all unanswerable ones for the strategic thinking of “keeping a low profile”. To claim that China would continue to stick to “keeping a low profile” when it grows strong and prosperous sounds unbelievable to those relatively weak and small countries; but to the United States and other Western countries still stronger than China, they might doubt if China were hiding it strategic intentions.

To avoid the negative effects of this expression while adhering to its substance, this author wishes to make two suggestions. First, do not make “keeping a low profile but playing a due role” an open policy but use “being modest and prudent” to express its substance in public. “To be modest and prudent” contains no pejorative meaning to either the internal or external public and has more definite connotation and denotation, which fittingly reflects the essence of the Chinese culture. The Chinese government and all Chinese enterprises and nationals should display this spirit of being modest and prudent in their exchanges with other countries, whether developed or developing, in all their external economic and business activities, and during their travels, work or study abroad.

As early as in 1956, Mao Zedong pointed out in an article in commemoration of the 45thanniversary of the 1911 Revolution: China “ought to make a greater contribution to humanity. But for a long time in the past its contribution was far too small. For this we are regretful. However, we should be modest–not only now, but forty--five years hence and indeed always. In international relations, the Chinese people should rid themselves of great--nation chauvinism resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely.” The idea expressed by Mao Zedong is that China should make due contributions to the world while maintaining a modest and prudent attitude and discarding great--nation chauvinism. This idea is more relevant today when China is daily growing stronger than at the time when it was put forward.

In December 2010, State Councilor Dai Bingguo said the following on “keeping a low profile”: “Some people in foreign countries say that there is a saying in China called ‘keeping a low profile but playing a due role’ and hence guess that the announcement of taking the path of peaceful development by China is in fact an underhand scheme played by China when it is not yet strong. This is totally groundless suspicion. Comrade Deng Xiaoping used this expression at the end of 1980s and early 1990s and its main connotation is that China should remain modest and prudent, not be a leader, not engage in expansion and not practice hegemonism, which accords with the thinking of taking the path of peaceful development.” Here, the State Councilor also used “being modest and prudent” to express the connotation of “keeping a low profile”.

The second suggestion is to understand and express China’s long--term strategic objective and development orientation with more accurate language. Dai Bingguo made the expression this way: “China’s goal of development can be summed up in one sentence, that is, to build a harmonious society at home and a harmonious world abroad; in other words, China must first of all be responsible for the 1.3 billion Chinese people while at the same time for the world people and world peace and development so that the fruits of China’s development could benefit the domestic populace as well as the international community.” He also said:“As to what some people have said that China would replace the United States to lord over the world, this is simply a myth.”

However, we could occasionally hear another line of thought and expression concerning China’s development goal, that is, the long--sustaining ideal of “overtaking”, the more typical example of which is the call to “overtake Britain and catch up with the United States” during the years of “Great Leap Forward” in the 1950s. Now, some people have once again raised the national development goal of overtaking the United States not only economically but also militarily. In the minds of some people, whatever we Chinese build or do, it must be the tallest, biggest, strongest, most expensive and most luxuriant, and we should realize the “Chinese dream” as the Americans do the “American dream”, without thinking “that’s a myth”.

Let’s not say how the outside world would look at us if the second objective and line of thought were publicized in a big way, it is indeed just a myth if we wish to create another American--type superpower given China’s population base, natural resources, ecological environment, geological conditions and economic basis. What we should do to realize our national strategic goal is not to overtake the United States but ourselves. That is, to quicken our pace in transforming the economic development mode in light of the Scientific Outlook on Development and by coordinating the two overall domestic and international aspects, lay more emphasis on quality than on scale, pay more attention to people’s livelihood than to vanity projects, attach importance to social justice and harmony instead of sharpening the contradiction, and set store by real effects than seeking for various lists of ranking in the world.

In international relations, China’s goal should move from making “rejections” to making “demands”, from seeking after quick rise of strength to making contributions to the world through ideological and system innovation, from looking for expanded overseas market and supply of resources in the course of globalization to promoting the improvement of market rules and the international system, and from pursuing multi--polarization in a world of powers to establishing a law--governed just international order and mode of global governance together with other countries. Only when China evolves from a country with a large population, big economy and strong political system to one which enjoys harmony and is highly developed in education, science and technology, and culture, can we say that the Chinese nation has truly realized its dream.

Wang Jisi is Dean of School of International Studies, Peking University.