美國(guó)將遭遇一系列“微型探底”

文·本刊特邀專欄作家 泰德·普林斯（E. Ted Prince）博士

美國(guó)將遭遇一系列“微型探底”

文·本刊特邀專欄作家 泰德·普林斯（E. Ted Prince）博士

目前在美國(guó)乃至全世界討論的話題都是美國(guó)即將進(jìn)入又一輪衰退，即令人擔(dān)憂的“二次探底”。但情況有可能更糟，像日本一樣，美國(guó)未來(lái)20年都將無(wú)法逃脫“微型探底”(mini-dips)。

1949年以來(lái)，美國(guó)經(jīng)歷了11次經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退，算起來(lái)每隔5年半就發(fā)生一次。因此就算事態(tài)平穩(wěn)，美國(guó)距離下一次經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退也不過(guò)4年，即2014年。但美國(guó)的情況并不正常。公共債務(wù)在GDP中的比重快速增長(zhǎng)，這通常只在發(fā)展中國(guó)家出現(xiàn)。美國(guó)的這一比重已達(dá)到70%，未來(lái)兩三年可能升至100%。這就是經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)生危機(jī)的臨界點(diǎn)。

美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)通過(guò)了金融監(jiān)管方面的改革案，金融體系的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)將有所降低，大部分創(chuàng)新型的美國(guó)公司將走出美國(guó)。這將使美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)領(lǐng)域出現(xiàn)創(chuàng)新和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)都有所下降的局面。

美國(guó)還有其他嚴(yán)峻的問(wèn)題——利率現(xiàn)在超低，基本處于通貨緊縮中。現(xiàn)在唯一的問(wèn)題是這種通貨緊縮是像日本那樣一直持續(xù)，還是能暫時(shí)躲避風(fēng)頭。通常超低的利率之后會(huì)出現(xiàn)又一輪泡沫經(jīng)濟(jì)和衰退。這些都有可能在短期內(nèi)發(fā)生。而且美國(guó)的政治體系也越來(lái)越面臨僵局。如同日本一樣，有可能“一病不起”。癱瘓的政治體系無(wú)法做出決策，經(jīng)濟(jì)和金融體系也必然會(huì)走下坡路。

1980年代末和1990年代初，日本出現(xiàn)了戰(zhàn)后最大的經(jīng)濟(jì)泡沫，接著就是嚴(yán)重的經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退，至今都沒(méi)有真正結(jié)束。從那時(shí)起，日本經(jīng)歷了持續(xù)的通貨緊縮，股票和房地產(chǎn)的價(jià)格低于1990年的水平。日本的公共債務(wù)如今是GDP的200%。脆弱的日本政府（除了小泉當(dāng)政期間）無(wú)法對(duì)任何重大的事務(wù)做出決策。對(duì)此我們所稱之為的“微型探底”。這和經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退還有所不同。經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退中，GDP至少連續(xù)三個(gè)季度下降。而在“微型探底”中，GDP或至少是名義上的GDP停止增長(zhǎng)，可能出現(xiàn)下滑，但降幅不大，而且不會(huì)連續(xù)兩個(gè)季度下降。通常GDP會(huì)不上不下，或者在臨界點(diǎn)小幅波動(dòng)，不會(huì)有驚人的降幅。

經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退有一個(gè)很大的“益處”——當(dāng)大部分經(jīng)濟(jì)行為緊縮時(shí)，每個(gè)人都有所震動(dòng)，會(huì)減少浪費(fèi)并試圖以更加創(chuàng)新和高效的姿態(tài)來(lái)開(kāi)展新的業(yè)務(wù)。說(shuō)實(shí)話，衰退就是因禍得福。所以，關(guān)于衰退的“好消息”是每個(gè)人都會(huì)自我糾錯(cuò)，并推動(dòng)事物的發(fā)展。

“微型探底”不像衰退那樣觸動(dòng)人心。用美國(guó)詩(shī)人埃利奧特（T.S. Elliot）的話來(lái)說(shuō)，“微型探底”不是撞擊而是啜泣?！拔⑿吞降住北硎鞠禄?，但不足以讓人震驚并采取新的行動(dòng)。這么說(shuō)來(lái)，“微型探底”并不好，既不能產(chǎn)生震動(dòng)，又不能自我糾正。這也就是為什么日本在過(guò)去20年無(wú)所作為的原因。日本的人口老化，過(guò)度依賴社會(huì)保障制度，年輕人已見(jiàn)怪不怪，不足以推動(dòng)他們?nèi)ジ淖兘?jīng)濟(jì)衰退的發(fā)生。所以，當(dāng)人們跟我說(shuō)起美國(guó)的二次探底時(shí)，我的回答是，也就是美國(guó)才有如此的好運(yùn)氣。第二次經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退是又一次沖擊，美國(guó)政府和一籌莫展的政客應(yīng)該在此時(shí)有所作為。

泰德·普林斯

泰德·普林斯博士是佩斯領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力研究院（The Perth Leader-ship Institute）的創(chuàng)始人和首席執(zhí)行官，是領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力和財(cái)務(wù)績(jī)效領(lǐng)域的專家，著有《卓越領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者的三大財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)格》（The Three Financial Styles of Very Successful Leaders）專著。他還是佛羅里達(dá)大學(xué)課座教授，上海財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)MBA學(xué)院高頓財(cái)務(wù)金融培訓(xùn)中心課座教授

更有可能的是美國(guó)沒(méi)有進(jìn)入第二次衰退而是發(fā)生“微型探底”，這樣一來(lái)，沒(méi)有人會(huì)去解決嚴(yán)重的金融和政治問(wèn)題?！拔⑿吞降住敝?，GDP會(huì)在一到兩個(gè)季度里出現(xiàn)零增長(zhǎng)，接著會(huì)勉強(qiáng)有1%這樣的小幅攀升?！拔⑿吞降住焙?，將會(huì)出現(xiàn)一到兩年的零增長(zhǎng)或微小增長(zhǎng)（1%到2%），但不會(huì)下降。接下來(lái)的兩年里，可能會(huì)出現(xiàn)又一次“微型探底”。一系列“微型探底”中，GDP降到零或偶爾降到零以下，但時(shí)間不過(guò)是一到兩個(gè)季度而已。然后，GDP再反彈到零。未來(lái)很多年會(huì)出現(xiàn)很多次“微型探底”，就像日本一樣呈現(xiàn)出“微型探底”的經(jīng)濟(jì)態(tài)勢(shì)。但你可能會(huì)反駁說(shuō)，美國(guó)難道不是和日本一樣，有著超級(jí)人物掌控的超級(jí)公司，怎么可能出現(xiàn)“微型探底”？

答案是，公司仍可以蓬勃發(fā)展，政府卻從負(fù)債累累的經(jīng)濟(jì)中吸血，形成浮夸而沒(méi)有效率的官僚機(jī)構(gòu)。即便公眾對(duì)于這樣的政府和政客已很少或根本沒(méi)有信心，政府仍能生存，他們從私營(yíng)部門和人民身上榨取了更多的稅收。在美國(guó)，對(duì)政府的信心指數(shù)僅在20%左右。我們無(wú)法期望兩大政黨——民主黨或共和黨能有所作為。跟日本一樣，政府的更迭基本上沒(méi)有帶來(lái)什么變化。

我把某些國(guó)家稱之為“過(guò)度發(fā)展的國(guó)家”（簡(jiǎn)稱“ODCs”），這些國(guó)家在本國(guó)公民身上的支出超過(guò)了可負(fù)擔(dān)的范圍，只能向國(guó)外借款。他們指望后代能替他們償還債務(wù)。在這些國(guó)家，債務(wù)實(shí)際上反映出政治上的僵局。不削減開(kāi)支，只會(huì)從國(guó)外借款，的確比做出艱難的決策要容易得多。而私營(yíng)部門要給公共部門的超支買單。事實(shí)上，私營(yíng)部門的效率越高，公共部門的效率就越糟糕。這也就是為什么美國(guó)和日本以及歐洲一些國(guó)家出現(xiàn)了公私部門之間的巨大差距。

1960年代開(kāi)始，在解決了二戰(zhàn)出現(xiàn)的財(cái)政問(wèn)題后，歐洲國(guó)家就變成了過(guò)度發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家。日本則是在1980年代跨入了該行列。而美國(guó)剛變成過(guò)度發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家。不幸的是，缺少像小泉這樣的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人。過(guò)度發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的未來(lái)不好說(shuō)，美國(guó)也是如此。但美國(guó)和日本有一個(gè)很大的差別，美國(guó)的移民率很高，人口還在增長(zhǎng)，對(duì)于GDP的增長(zhǎng)來(lái)說(shuō)還有一些推動(dòng)力。日本則沒(méi)有這個(gè)優(yōu)勢(shì)。另外，即便美國(guó)的通貨緊縮加劇，影響也不大。我猜想人口的增長(zhǎng)最終將在很大程度上抵消通貨緊縮的后果。因此我認(rèn)為，美國(guó)的“微型探底”不會(huì)像日本那樣糟糕。即便美國(guó)的通貨緊縮越來(lái)越厲害，也不會(huì)比日本差。當(dāng)然這沒(méi)什么可高興的，不過(guò)即便不能完全躲開(kāi)衰退，美國(guó)也可以規(guī)避日本衰退中最讓人揪心的那部分。

The smart talk now in the US and globally is that the US is about to enter another recession – the much feared doubledip recession. However what is likely to happen is even worse – a series of mini-dips over the next 20 years that the US will not be able to exit from, just like Japan.

The US has had 11 recessions since 1949.That’s one recession every 5.5 years. So even if things were normal, the US could expect another recession by 2014, that is, in 4 years time.

But things aren’t normal in the US.Public debt as a proportion of GDP is increasing rapidly to levels normally seen only in developing countries. The US is already at the 70% level and should get to the 100% level in 2-3 years. That’s the danger point at which an economy can default.

The financial regulatory reform that has just been passed by Congress will lead to less risk-taking in the financial system and will result in the most innovative US companies moving out of the US which will lead to less innovation and risk-taking in the US financial arena.

The US has other major problems too. Interest rates are ultra-low. The US is essentially in deflation; the only issue now is whether this deflation will be permanent like Japan or whether the US can dodge the bullet for the moment. Usually ultra-low interest rates are followed by another bubble and then another recession. They are quite probable now in a short time.

And the US political system is increasingly in gridlock. Again it increasingly resembles the Japanese political system which is essentially permanently in paralysis.

Paralyzed political systems where decisions cannot be made lead to paralyzed economies and paralyzed financial systems.That’s because it’s hard to get agreement on anything, much less get agreement on making hard choices like cutting government spending. Paralyzed governments tend to have high debt and multiple financial crises.That’s where the US is heading now.

We have seen this movie before. In the late 1980s and early 1990s Japan had had its biggest post-war bubble. It was followed by a deep recession. Essentially the recession has never ended.

Japan has experienced almost continual deflation since then; prices of stocks and real estate are below where they were in 1990.Japan’s public debt is now 200% of GDP. Its weak government has never (with one brief exception under Prime Minister Koizumi)been able to take decisive action on anything significant.

Since the early 1990s Japan has undergone a series of what we call mini-dips.

A mini-dip is a different animal to a recession. In a recession, GDP declines for at least three quarters in a row. In a minidip, GDP, or least nominal GDP, does not grow and it may decline, but not by much and not for more than two quarters in a row.Nor does it rise much. It just does nothing but stay around zero, just a little above, or a little below. Nothing dramatic at all.

Recessions have one big benefit. When economic activity contracts a lot, it gives a big shock to everyone and then they do things like cutting waste and actually doing new things to become more innovative and efficient which they would never have done otherwise. Recessions are actually blessings in disguise. So the good news about recession is that it is essentially self-correcting and gets things moving again.

Mini-dips are not like recessions. They do not deliver a shock. To para-phrase the American poet T. S. Elliot, a mini-dip ends not in a bang, but a whimper. Mini-dips deliver a decline, but not one that is big enough for anyone to be shocked into doing anything new. So mini-dips are bad because they are not shocking and they are not selfcorrecting.

That’s why Japan has done nothing for the past 20 years. It’s a country with far too many old people who are living on social security who have no energy to do anything.And the younger people and businessmen are used to seeing it all before. There has been no recession big enough to motivate them to do anything different.

Japan is a permanent mini-dip society that has grown too old, comfortable and lazy to do anything about the deep social and political problems it is experiencing.

So when people talk to me about a double dip recession in the US, my answer is, if only the US could be so lucky. A second recession now would be another shock and maybe the US government and its moribund politicians would actually do something significant this time.

The far more likely scenario is that the US is not going into another recession but instead just going into a mini-dip that will motivate no-one to tackle the deep financial and politician problems in the US. The minidip will involve GDP growth at zero for one or two quarters and then it will crawl up to a growth rate like 1%.

That mini-dip will be followed by a year or two of no-growth or little growth (think 1-2%) but no decline. Then in another 2 years it will be followed by another mini-dip. A series of mini-dips where GDP goes to zero,or occasionally to below zero but just for one or two quarters. Then it bounces up to zero again. Lots of mini-dips over lots of years. A mini-dip economy, just like Japan.

More iPhones, More Government?

But, you might object, doesn’t the US,just like Japan, have superb companies with superb people inventing superb new products?How can mini-dips happen with such great companies and such great people?

The answer is that companies can still prosper while the government is sucking the life out of the economy with high debt and a bloated and ineffective bureaucracy.Governments like this can survive even when the public has little or no confidence in its politicians because they can always get more taxes out of the private sector and the people.

In the US and Japan, confidence in politicians runs at around 20% of so. And in the US we can’t expect either major party –Democrats or Republicans - to do anything about it. That’s just like Japan where a recent change in government has made absolutely no difference at all.

I have written before about a class of countries that I call Over-Developed Countries, ODCs. ODCs are developed countries that spend more on their citizens than they can afford to and borrow the difference from foreigners. They rely on future generations of their citizens having to pay back this debt.

In ODCs, the debt actually reflects political gridlock. It’s easier to make no spending cuts and borrow from foreigners rather than to make hard spending decisions.In ODCs the purpose of the private sector is to pay for the excesses of the public sector.In fact the more efficient the private sector,the worse and more inefficient is the public sector. That’s why you see the huge gap in competence between the public and the private sector in the US and Japan, and to a lesser extent in Europe.

European countries started to become ODCs in the 1960s, once they had solved the financial problems created by World War II. Japan became an ODC in the late 1980s.The US is just achieving ODC status now.Unfortunately without a leader like Japan’s Koizumi, and there aren’t many like him, the future is not good for ODCs. That includes the US.

However there is one big difference between the US and Japan. That is that the US, mainly due to a high level of immigration, still has population growth and that will put some upward pressure on GDP growth figures. Japan doesn’t have that advantage.

On the other hand if US deflation gets worse, that might not matter so much.My guess is that eventually an expanding population will help counter-act deflation in the US to a great extent.

So I think that the US mini-dips won’t be as bad as the Japan mini-dips. The deflation,even if it gets worse in the US will still not be as bad as Japan. Nothing to get excited about,but maybe the US will avoid the worst parts of the Japanese disease, even if it doesn’t avoid it completely.

“A Serial Mini-Dip Economy is the Future of the US”

Dr. E. Ted Prince

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