不妨除去銀行的光芒

Ｐａｕｌ?。耍颍酰纾恚幔?/p>

Thirty-plus years ago, when I was a graduate student in economics, only the least ambitious of my classmates sought careers in the financial world. Even then, investment banks paid more than teaching or public service - but not that much more, and anyway, everyone knew that banking was, well, boring.

In the years that followed, of course, banking became anything but boring. Wheeling and dealing flourished, and pay scales in finance shot up, drawing in many of the nation's best and brightest young people (O.K., I'm not so sure about the 'best' part). And we were assured that our supersized financial sector was the key to prosperity.

Instead, however, finance turned into the monster that ate the world economy.

Recently, the economists Thomas Philippon and Ariell Reshef circulated a paper that could have been titled The Rise and Fall of Boring Banking (it's actually titled Wages and Human Capital in the U.S. Financial Industry, 1909-2006). They show that banking in America has gone through three eras over the past century.

Before 1930, banking was an exciting industry featuring a number of larger-than-life figures, who built giant financial empires (some of which later turned out to have been based on fraud). This highflying finance sector presided over a rapid increase in debt: Household debt as a percentage of G.D.P. almost doubled between World War I and 1929.

During this first era of high finance, bankers were, on average, paid much more than their counterparts in other industries. But finance lost its glamour when the banking system collapsed during the Great Depression.

The banking industry that emerged from that collapse was tightly regulated, far less colorful than it had been before the Depression, and far less lucrative for those who ran it. Banking became boring, partly because bankers were so conservative about lending: Household debt, which had fallen sharply as a percentage of G.D.P. during the Depression and World War II, stayed far below pre-1930s levels.

Strange to say, this era of boring banking was also an era of spectacular economic progress for most Americans.

After 1980, however, as the political winds shifted, many of the regulations on banks were lifted - and banking became exciting again. Debt began rising rapidly, eventually reaching just about the same level relative to G.D.P. as in 1929. And the financial industry exploded in size. By the middle of this decade, it accounted for a third of corporate profits.

As these changes took place, finance again became a high-paying career - spectacularly high-paying for those who built new financial empires. Indeed, soaring incomes in finance played a large role in creating America's second Gilded Age.

Needless to say, the new superstars believed that they had earned their wealth. 'I think that the results our company had, which is where the great majority of my wealth came from, justified what I got,' said Sanford Weill in 2007, a year after he had retired from Citigroup. And many economists agreed.

Only a few people warned that this supercharged financial system might come to a bad end. Perhaps the most notable Cassandra was Raghuram Rajan of the University of Chicago, a former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, who argued at a 2005 conference that the rapid growth of finance had increased the risk of a 'catastrophic meltdown.' But other participants in the conference, including Lawrence Summers, now the head of the National Economic Council, ridiculed Mr. Rajan's concerns.

And the meltdown came.

Much of the seeming success of the financial industry has now been revealed as an illusion. (Citigroup stock has lost more than 90 percent of its value since Mr. Weill congratulated himself.) Worse yet, the collapse of the financial house of cards has wreaked havoc with the rest of the economy, with world trade and industrial output actually falling faster than they did in the Great Depression. And the catastrophe has led to calls for much more regulation of the financial industry.

But my sense is that policy makers are still thinking mainly about rearranging the boxes on the bank supervisory organization chart. They're not at all ready to do what needs to be done - which is to make banking boring again.

Part of the problem is that boring banking would mean poorer bankers, and the financial industry still has a lot of friends in high places. But it's also a matter of ideology: Despite everything that has happened, most people in positions of power still associate fancy finance with economic progress.

Can they be persuaded otherwise? Will we find the will to pursue serious financial reform? If not, the current crisis won't be a one-time event; it will be the shape of things to come.

30多年前，我還是一名在讀經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研究生時(shí)，只有最沒志向的同學(xué)才投身金融界。盡管當(dāng)時(shí)投資銀行的薪酬高于教師或公務(wù)員的收入——但不是高很多，而且大家都知道銀行業(yè)很無聊。

以后的歲月里，銀行業(yè)自然變得一點(diǎn)兒也不無聊了。投機(jī)取巧盛行，金融業(yè)的薪資標(biāo)準(zhǔn)暴漲，吸引了國內(nèi)最優(yōu)秀聰明的青年才?。ㄎ覍Α白顑?yōu)秀”心存疑問）。我們確信龐大的金融業(yè)對于繁榮至關(guān)重要。

然而，金融反倒變成怪物，侵吞了世界經(jīng)濟(jì)。

最近，經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家托馬斯?費(fèi)立蓬和阿里爾?雷謝夫發(fā)表了一篇論文，題為《1909-2006美國金融業(yè)薪酬與人力資本》，其實(shí)可以命為《無聊銀行業(yè)的興衰》。他們表示，一個(gè)世紀(jì)以來美國銀行業(yè)經(jīng)歷了三個(gè)時(shí)代。

1930年以前，銀行業(yè)是個(gè)激動人心的行業(yè)，涌現(xiàn)了一批傳奇人物，他們建立了龐大的金融帝國（某些之后經(jīng)證實(shí)屬詐騙）。金融業(yè)迅猛發(fā)展，導(dǎo)致債務(wù)激增：一戰(zhàn)至1929年間，國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值中家庭債務(wù)的比例幾乎翻了一番。

這是金融的第一個(gè)繁榮期，銀行家的收入比其他行業(yè)相同職位的人高很多。但在大蕭條時(shí)期，銀行體系崩潰，金融也黯然失色。

崩潰后重生的銀行業(yè)受到了嚴(yán)格的監(jiān)管，吸引力遠(yuǎn)小于大蕭條之前，銀行老板的收入也少得多。銀行業(yè)變得無聊，部分是源于銀行家對于貸款非常謹(jǐn)慎：家庭債務(wù)所占國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的比例在大蕭條和二戰(zhàn)時(shí)期大幅下降，此時(shí)也遠(yuǎn)低于30年代之前的水平。

說來也怪，對于多數(shù)美國人而言，這段銀行業(yè)無聊乏味的時(shí)期卻是經(jīng)濟(jì)突飛猛進(jìn)的時(shí)代。

然而，80年代之后，由于政治風(fēng)向改變，許多銀行監(jiān)管措施都取消了——銀行業(yè)再次變得刺激。債務(wù)開始劇增，其在國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值中的比例最終同1929年持平。金融業(yè)急劇擴(kuò)張。80年代中期，它已占到公司總利潤的三分之一。

有了這些改變，金融業(yè)又成為高薪行業(yè)——建立新金融帝國的人收入奇高。的確，金融業(yè)利潤的飆升很大程度上造就了美國的第二個(gè)黃金年代。

不必說，新的超級巨星相信財(cái)富是他們自己掙得的?！拔医^大多數(shù)的財(cái)富都來自我們公司，我認(rèn)為公司業(yè)績證明了我的所得名正言順，”斯坦福德?威爾2007年說，他于2006年從花旗集團(tuán)退休。許多經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家同意他的話。

只有少數(shù)人警告說，這種超負(fù)荷的金融體系可能下場凄慘。也許最著名的預(yù)言家是芝加哥大學(xué)的拉古拉邁?拉詹，國際貨幣基金組織前任首席經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家，2005年他在一次會議上表示，金融業(yè)的迅速發(fā)展增加了“巨大災(zāi)難”的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。但其他與會者，包括現(xiàn)任美國國家經(jīng)濟(jì)委員會主任勞倫斯?薩默斯則嘲笑拉詹是杞人憂天。

災(zāi)難終于降臨。

現(xiàn)在看來，金融業(yè)表面的風(fēng)光實(shí)則多為假象。（自從威爾先生自夸后，花旗集團(tuán)股價(jià)縮水了90%。）更糟糕的是，脆弱的金融體系崩潰后，嚴(yán)重破壞了其他經(jīng)濟(jì)領(lǐng)域，世界貿(mào)易和工業(yè)產(chǎn)出實(shí)際上比大蕭條時(shí)期下降得還快。災(zāi)難發(fā)生后，人們呼吁大力加強(qiáng)金融業(yè)的監(jiān)管。

但我覺得決策者考慮的主要還是重整銀行監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)。他們并不大愿意去做需要做的事情——即讓銀行業(yè)再次變得無聊。

問題之一是，如果銀行業(yè)無聊乏味，銀行家的荷包就會縮水，而金融業(yè)有很多身居高位的熟人。但這也是理念問題：雖然事態(tài)紛紜，大多數(shù)掌權(quán)者仍把復(fù)雜的金融和經(jīng)濟(jì)增長聯(lián)系起來。

能改變他們的觀念么？我們能下決心切實(shí)進(jìn)行金融改革么？如果做不到，目前的危機(jī)不會如過眼云煙；它預(yù)示著更多危機(jī)的到來。

《紐約時(shí)報(bào)》